Publications
Journal Articles:
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Apperly, I.A. & Butterfill, S.A,, (In Press). Psychological Review. PDF
Online use of mental state inferences continues to develop in late adolescence. Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I.A., & Blakemore, S.J. (In Press). Developmental Science. PDF
Two routes to perspective: imagination and rule-use may be better than simulation and theorising. Commentary on Mitchell et al. (2009). Apperly, I.A. (In Press). British Journal of Developmental Psychology. PDF
Frontal and parietal lobe involvement in the recognition of pretence and intention. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (In Press). Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.
How do symbols affect 3- to 4-year-olds’ executive function? Evidence from a strategic reasoning task. Apperly, I.A & Carroll, D.J., (In Press). Developmental Science. PDF
Studies of adults can inform accounts of theory of mind development. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G.W. (2009). Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 190-201. PDF
The effect of action goal hierarchy on the coding of object orientation in imitation tasks: Evidence from patients with left parietal lobe damage. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (2008). Cognitive Neuropsychology, 25)7-8), 1011-1026. PDF
Beyond Simulation-Theory and Theory-Theory: Why social cognitive neuroscience should use its own concepts to study “Theory of Mind”. Apperly, I.A., (2008). Cognition 107, 266-283. PDF
The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adult performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task. Apperly, I.A., Back, E., Samson, D. & France, L. (2008). Cognition, 106, 1093-1108. PDF
Choosing between two objects reduces 3-year-olds errors on a reverse-contingency test of executive function. Carroll, D.J., Apperly, I.A & Riggs,K.J. (2007). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 98(3), 184-192. PDF
Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in "theory of mind": Neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., & Humphreys, G.W. (2007). Neuropsychologia. 45(11), 2561-2569. PDF
Is theory of mind understanding impaired in males with fragile X Syndrome? Grant, C.M., Apperly, I.A. & Oliver, C. (2007). Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 36(1) 17-28. PDF
Exploring the functional and anatomical bases of mirror-image and anatomical imitation: the role of the frontal lobes. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (2007). Neuropsychologia, 45(4) 784-795. PDF
The executive demands of strategic reasoning are modified by the way in which children are prompted to think about the task: Evidence from 3-to 4-year-olds. Carroll, D.J., Apperly, I.A. & Riggs,K.J. (2007). Cognitive Development, 22(1), 142-148. PDF
Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, 'reality-unknown' false belief and false photograph tasks. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., Bickerton, W. & Humphreys, G.W. (2007). Cognition, 103, 300-321. PDF
Intact 1st and 2nd order false belief reasoning in a patient with severely impaired grammar. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Carroll, N., Hussain, S., & Humphreys, G.W. (2006). Social Neuroscience, Special issue on theory of mind, 1(3-4), 334-348. PDF
Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Relative Ignorance: Handling of Possibilities Under Conditions of Epistemic and Physical Uncertainty. Robinson, E.J., Rowley, M.J., Beck, S.R., Carroll, D.J., & Apperly, I.A. (2006) Child Development 77(6), 1642-1655. PDF
Is belief reasoning automatic? Apperly, I.A., Riggs, K.J., Simpson, A., Samson, D., & Chiavarino, C. (2006). Psychological Science.17(10) 841-844 PDF
Children’s thinking about counterfactuals and future hypotheticals as possibilities. Beck, S.R., Robinson, E.J., Carroll, D.J., & Apperly, I.A. (2006). Child Development 77(2), 413-426 PDF
Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G.W. (2005). Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(12), 572-577. PDF
Seeing it my way: A case of selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Kathirgamanathan, U. & Humphreys, G.W. (2005). Brain. 128, 1102-1111. PDF
Frontal and temporo-parietal lobe contribution to Theory of Mind: Neuropsychological evidence from a false belief task with reduced language and executive demands. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C. & Humphreys, G.W. (2004). Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16(10) 1773-1784 PDF
Three- to four-year-olds’ recognition that symbols have a stable meaning: Pictures are understood before written words. Apperly, I.A., Williams, E. & Williams, J. (2004). Child Development, 75(5) 1510-1522. PDF
The left tempero-parietal junction is necessary for representing someone else’s belief. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Chiavarino, C. & Humphreys, G.W. (2004) Nature Neuroscience, 7(5) 449-500. PDF (Supp. methods)
When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence for systematic variation in 5-6 year old children’s reasoning about beliefs and belief reports. Apperly, I.A. & Robinson, E.J. (2003). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 85(4) 297-311 PDF
Five year olds’ handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation. Apperly, I.A. & Robinson, E.J. (2002). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83(1), 53-75 PDF
Children’s difficulties handling dual identity. Apperly, I.A., & Robinson, E.J. (2001). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 78, 374-397. PDF
Problems with partial representations explain children’s related difficulties with ambiguous messages and referentially opaque contexts. Robinson, E.J. Apperly, I.A. (2001). Cognitive Development. 16(1), 595-615. PDF
Children’s mental representation of referential relations. Apperly, I.A., & Robinson, E.J. (1998). Cognition, 67,287-309. PDF
Adolescents’ and adults’ views about the evidential basis for beliefs: Relativism and determinism re-examined. Robinson, E.J. Apperly, I.A. (1998). Developmental Science, 1 279-290.
Other articles:
Theory of mind. Apperly, I.A. (In Press) In Bruce Goldstein (Ed.) Enclyclopaedia of Perception. Sage.
Articles under submission are available on request
Seeing it your way: Evidence for altercentric intrusion effects in visual perspective taking. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Braithwaite, J. & Andrews, B. (Under submission).
The Computation of Belief-like States: Evidence for an Efficient Though Inflexible Mechanism in Adults. Wang, J.J., Apperly, I.A., Samson, D. & Braithwaite, J.J. (Under submission)
Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription. Back, E., & Apperly, I.A. (under submission).
Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults’ ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker. Apperly, I.A., Carroll, D.J., Samson,D., Qureshi, A., Humphreys, G.W. & Moffatt, G. (Under submission).
How do novel response modes help 3- to 4-year-olds to act on rules that induce response conflict? Carroll, D.J., Apperly, I.A & Riggs,K.J. (Under submission).
Frontal and parietal lobe involvement in the recognition of pretence and intention. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (Under submission).
Thesis:
Children's mental representation of referential relations: Representational
partitioning and 'theory of mind'. University of Birmingham, 1999. Supervised by
Prof. Elizabeth Robinson.