Ian Apperly

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Publications

 

Book:

 

 

 

 

Book Chapter:

Can theory of mind grow up? Mindreading in adults, and its implications for the neuroscience and development of mindreading. Apperly, I.A. (2013) In Baron-Cohen, S., Tager-Flusberg, H. & Lombardo, M. (Eds.) Understanding Other Minds (3rd Edn.) PDF

 

Journal Articles:

Why Can’t Children Piece Their Knowledge Together? The Puzzling Difficulty of Tool Innovation. Cutting, N., Chappell, J., Apperly, I.A. & Beck, S.R. (In press) Journal of Experimental Child Psychology.

Representation, Control or Reasoning? Distinct Functions for Theory of Mind within the Medial Prefrontal Cortex. Hartwright, C., Apperly, I.A., & Hansen, P.C. (2013) Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 26(4), 683-698PDF

The use of embodied self-rotation for visual and spatial perspective-taking. Surtees, A., Apperly, I.A. & Samson (2013). Frontiers in Cognition, 7, 698. PDF

 

Similarities and differences in visual and spatial perspective-taking processes. Surtees, A., Apperly, I.A. & Samson, D. (2013). Cognition, 129(2) 426-438. PDF

 

Seeing it my way or your way: Frontoparietal brain areas sustain viewpoint-independent perspective selection processes. Ramsey, R., Hansen, P.C., Apperly I.A & Samson, D. (2013).Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 25(5), 670-8. PDF

 

The development of tool manufacture in humans: what helps young children make innovative tools? Chappell, J., Cutting, N. Apperly, I.A. & Beck, S.R., (In press) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B.

How to construct a minimal theory of mind. Butterfill, S. & Apperly I.A. (In press). Mind and Language28(2) 606-637. PDF

What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences. Apperly, I.A. (2012). Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 65(5), 825-839. PDF

Understanding intentions: distinct processes for mirroring, representing and conceptualising. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A., & Humphreys, G.W. (2012). Current Directions in Psychological Science.21(5),  284-289. PDF

Developmental differences in the control of action selection by social information. Dumontheil. I., Hillebrandt, H., Apperly, I.A. & Blakemore, S-J. (2012) Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.24(10), 2080-2095. PDF

Multiple roles for executive control in belief-desire reasoning: Distinct neural networks are recruited for self perspective inhibition and complexity of reasoning. Hartwright, C., Apperly, I.A., & Hansen, P.C. (2012) Neuroimage(61(4), 921-930 . PDF

How do novel response modes help 3- to 4-year-olds to act on rules that induce response conflict? Carroll, D.J., Apperly, I.A, Riggs,K.J. & Graham, K. (2012). Cognitive Development,112(3), 312-325. PDF

Tool innovation may be a critical limiting step for the establishment of a rich tool-using culture: a perspective from child development. Commentary on Vaesen. Beck, S.R., Chappell, J., Apperly, I.A. & Cutting, N. (2012). Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 34(4), 220.

Direct and indirect measures of Level-2 perspective-taking in children and adults. Surtees, A., Butterfill, S. & Apperly, I.A. (2012). British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1), 75-86 PDF

Egocentrism and automatic perspective-taking in children and adults. Surtees, A. & Apperly, I.A. (2012). Child Development. 83 (2), 452–460.PDF

Sometimes losing your self in space: spontaneous use of intrinsic and relative spatial reference frames in children and adults. Surtees, A., Noordzij, M.L. & Apperly, I.A. (2012). Developmental Psychology.48(1), 185-191. PDF

The neural and cognitive time-course of theory of mind. McCleery, J.P., Surtees, A., Graham, K.A., Richards, J. & Apperly, I.A. (2011). Journal of Neuroscience.31(36): 12849 –12854  PDF

Repeating words in sentences: effects of sentence structure. Wheeldon, L., Smith, M.C. & Apperly, I.A. (2011). JEP:LMC. 37(5), 1051-1064.  

 

Developmental continuity in theory of mind: Speed and accuracy of belief-desire reasoning in children and adults. Apperly,I.A., Warren, F., Andrews, B.J., Grant, J. & Todd, S. (2011). Child Development. 82(5), 1691-703.   PDF

 

Cognitive Correlates of the Out-of-Body-Experience (OBE) in the Psychologically Normal Population: Evidence for an increased Role of Temporal-lobe Instability, Body-distortion Processing, and impairments in Own-Body-Transformations. Braithwaite, J.J., Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Boglia, E., & Hulleman, J. (2011) Cortex.

 

Children’s Tool Innovation Difficulties: A Mental Flexibility Problem? Cutting, N., Apperly, I.A. & Beck, S.R. (2011). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 119, 301-306. PDF

Making tools isn’t child’s play. Beck, S.R., Apperly, I.A., Chappell, J., Guthrie, C. & Cutting, N. (2011). Cognition.119, 301-306. PDF

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: New directions in theory of mind research. Samson, D. & Apperly, I.A. (2010). Infant and Child Development. 19, 443-454. PDF

 

Executive function is necessary for perspective-selection, not Level-1 visual perspective-calculation: Evidence from a dual-task study of adults. Qureshi, A., Apperly, I.A. & Samson, D. (2010). Cognition, 117(2), 230-236.PDF

 

Distinguishing intentions from desires: contributions of the frontal and parietal lobes. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (2010) Cognition, 117(2), 203-216. PDF

 

Taking perspective into account in a communication task. Dumontheil, I., Kuster, O., Apperly, I.A. & Blakemore, S-J. (2010). Neuroimage 52(4) 1574-1583. PDF

 

Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Braithwaite, J. & Andrews, B. (2010). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 36(5), 1255-1266. PDF

 

Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription. Back, E., & Apperly, I.A. (2010). Cognition, 115(1), 54-70. . PDF

 

Why are there limits on theory of mind use? Evidence from adults’ ability to follow instructions from an ignorant speaker. Apperly, I.A., Carroll, D.J., Samson,D., Qureshi, A., Humphreys, G.W. & Moffatt, G. (2010). Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. PDF

 

Online use of mental state inferences continues to develop in late adolescence. Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I.A., & Blakemore, S.J. (2010). Developmental Science, 13(2), 331-8. PDF

Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Apperly, I.A. & Butterfill, S.A,, (2009). Psychological Review.116(4), 953-970. PDF

Two routes to perspective: imagination and rule-use may be better than simulation and theorising. Commentary on Mitchell et al. (2009). Apperly, I.A. (2009). British Journal of Developmental Psychology. 27, 545-553 PDF

Frontal and parietal lobe involvement in the recognition of pretence and intention. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (2009). Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.62(9), 1738-1756. PDF

How do symbols affect 3- to 4-year-olds’ executive function? Evidence from a strategic reasoning task. Apperly, I.A & Carroll, D.J., (2009). Developmental Science12(6), 1070-1082. PDF

Studies of adults can inform accounts of theory of mind development.  Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G.W. (2009). Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 190-201. PDF

The effect of action goal hierarchy on the coding of object orientation in imitation tasks: Evidence from patients with left parietal lobe damage. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (2008). Cognitive Neuropsychology, 25)7-8), 1011-1026. PDF

Beyond Simulation-Theory and Theory-Theory: Why social cognitive neuroscience should use its own concepts to study “Theory of Mind”. Apperly, I.A., (2008). Cognition 107, 266-283. PDF

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adult performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task. Apperly, I.A., Back, E., Samson, D. & France, L. (2008). Cognition, 106, 1093-1108. PDF

Choosing between two objects reduces 3-year-olds errors on a reverse-contingency test of executive function. Carroll, D.J., Apperly, I.A & Riggs,K.J. (2007). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 98(3), 184-192. PDF

Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in "theory of mind": Neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task.  Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., & Humphreys, G.W. (2007). Neuropsychologia. 45(11), 2561-2569. PDF

Is theory of mind understanding impaired in males with fragile X Syndrome? Grant, C.M., Apperly, I.A. & Oliver, C. (2007). Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 36(1) 17-28. PDF

Exploring the functional and anatomical bases of mirror-image and anatomical imitation: the role of the frontal lobes. Chiavarino, C., Apperly, I.A. & Humphreys, G.W. (2007). Neuropsychologia, 45(4) 784-795. PDF

The executive demands of strategic reasoning are modified by the way in which children are prompted to think about the task: Evidence from 3-to 4-year-olds. Carroll, D.J., Apperly, I.A. & Riggs,K.J. (2007). Cognitive Development, 22(1), 142-148. PDF

Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, 'reality-unknown' false belief and false photograph tasks. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., Bickerton, W. & Humphreys, G.W. (2007). Cognition, 103, 300-321. PDF

Intact 1st and 2nd order false belief reasoning in a patient with severely impaired grammar.  Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Carroll, N., Hussain, S., & Humphreys, G.W. (2006). Social Neuroscience, Special issue on theory of mind, 1(3-4), 334-348. PDF

Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Relative Ignorance: Handling of Possibilities Under Conditions of Epistemic and Physical Uncertainty. Robinson, E.J., Rowley, M.J., Beck, S.R., Carroll, D.J., & Apperly, I.A. (2006) Child Development 77(6), 1642-1655. PDF

Is belief reasoning automatic? Apperly, I.A., Riggs, K.J., Simpson, A., Samson, D., & Chiavarino, C. (2006). Psychological Science.17(10) 841-844 PDF

Children’s thinking about counterfactuals and future hypotheticals as possibilities. Beck, S.R., Robinson, E.J., Carroll, D.J., & Apperly, I.A. (2006). Child Development 77(2), 413-426 PDF

Domain-specificity and theory of mind: Evaluating evidence from neuropsychology. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., & Humphreys, G.W. (2005).  Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(12), 572-577. PDF

Seeing it my way: A case of selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Kathirgamanathan, U. & Humphreys, G.W. (2005).  Brain. 128, 1102-1111. PDF

Frontal and temporo-parietal lobe contribution to Theory of Mind: Neuropsychological evidence from a false belief task with reduced language and executive demands. Apperly, I.A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C. & Humphreys, G.W. (2004). Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16(10) 1773-1784 PDF

Three- to four-year-olds’ recognition that symbols have a stable meaning: Pictures are understood before written words. Apperly, I.A., Williams, E. & Williams, J. (2004). Child Development, 75(5) 1510-1522. PDF

The left temporo-parietal junction is necessary for representing someone else’s belief. Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Chiavarino, C. & Humphreys, G.W. (2004)  Nature Neuroscience, 7(5) 449-500. PDF (Supp. methods)

False belief reasoning and the acquisition of relative clause sentences. Smith, M., Apperly, I.A. & White, V. (2003) Child Development 74(6) 1709-1719 PDF

When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence for systematic variation in 5-6 year old children’s reasoning about beliefs and belief reports. Apperly, I.A. & Robinson, E.J. (2003). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 85(4) 297-311 PDF

Five year olds’ handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation. Apperly, I.A. & Robinson, E.J. (2002). Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83(1), 53-75 PDF

Children’s difficulties handling dual identity. Apperly, I.A., & Robinson, E.J. (2001).  Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 78, 374-397. PDF

Problems with partial representations explain children’s related difficulties with ambiguous messages and referentially opaque contexts. Robinson, E.J.  Apperly, I.A. (2001). Cognitive Development. 16(1), 595-615. PDF

Children’s mental representation of referential relations. Apperly, I.A., & Robinson, E.J. (1998). Cognition, 67,287-309. PDF

Adolescents’ and adults’ views about the evidential basis for beliefs: Relativism and determinism re-examined. Robinson, E.J.  Apperly, I.A. (1998). Developmental Science, 1 279-290.

 

Articles under submission are available on request:

 

Does the level-1/level-2 distinction provide a limit to efficient perspective processing in adults? Surtees, A. & Apperly, I.A. (Under submission).

Cross-disciplinary views on perspective taking: Where to look for the embodied origins of mentalizing. Kessler, K. Apperly, I.A. & Butterfill, S. (Under submission).

Task-constraints and semantic association facilitates perspective use during discourse interpretation. Ferguson, H.J., Apperly, I.A., Ahmad, J. & Bindermann, M. (Under submission).

Perspective-taking during reading: an eyetracking study. Back. E., Apperly, I.A., Price, J. & Frisson, S. (Under submission)

I’ve got your number: Spontaneous perspective-taking in an interactive task. Surtees, A., Apperly, I.A. & Samson, D. (Under submission).

Just One Look: Direct Gaze Disrupts Visual Working Memory. Wang, J.J. & Apperly, I.A. (Under submission)

The Development of Co-representation Effects in a Joint Task: Do Children Represent a Co-actor? Milward, S., Kita, S. & Apperly, I.A. (Under submission).

 

Thesis:    

Children's mental representation of referential relations: Representational partitioning and 'theory of mind'. University of Birmingham, 1999. Supervised by Prof. Elizabeth Robinson.
PDF.