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Ian Apperly |
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A "two-systems" approach to theory of mind In a recent paper with Stephen Butterfill I argue for a two-systems approach to everyday perspective-taking and social reasoning. We think it highly unlikely that a single psychological faculty for "theory of mind" could support both moment-by moment co-operation and competition, and the sort of complex psychological reasoning necessary for evaluating the guilt of the accused in a court of law. We suggest that these competing demands can only be satisfied by having distinct cognitive systems that make different trade-offs between flexibility and cognitive efficiency. Infants and some non-human animals have one or more cognitively efficient processes for "theory of mind", which also support adults' moment-by-moment social cognition. However, older children and adults have, in addition, a more flexible capacity for psychological reasoning that supports sophisticated judgements but makes heavy demands on memory and executive function. For us this sheds light on otherwise confusing patterns of success and failure in the theory of mind abilities of non-human animals, infants, children and adults. This line of thinking has motivated much of my recent empirical work. |