Ian
Apperly
Publications
Ian
Apperly
Publications
Reader in Psychology
University of Birmingham Awards and Honours
Edgbaston, Birmingham Media
B15 2TT
0121 414 3339 Email me if you are interested in applying to study for a PhD
i.a.apperly@bham.ac.uk More information on PhDs in Birmingham here
Research on "theory of mind" in adults
Much of my current work looks at adults' perspective-taking and social reasoning. We frequently need to take account of what other people think, want or know in order to make sense of what they do and say. I am interested in how we do this, and particularly the cognitive basis of reasoning about mental states such as knowledge, desires, intentions and beliefs. We already know a lot about how and when these abilities develop, and how they vary across species, but we know amazingly little about how adults do this kind of social reasoning. I am looking at this in two related ways.
The cognitive neuroscience of theory of mind. I am involved in collaborative research with several colleagues (especially Dana Samson and Glyn Humphreys) that examines perspective-taking and social reasoning in patients with acquired brain damage. (An introduction to this work can be found here). We find that damage to different brain regions can lead to quite different functional impairments, which gives us clues both about the functional architecture of "theory of mind" and how this is implemented in the brain. In new work at the Birmingham University Imaging Centre, in collaboration with Peter Hansen, we are seeking complementary evidence from the use of functional imaging to study "theory of mind" processes in the intact brain.
The cognitive psychology of theory of
mind. "Theory of mind" is a neglected topic in the cognitive psychology
of typical adults, so that most of what we know is extrapolated from what we
know about "theory of mind" in children, and in clinical populations or
brain damaged patients. In recent work I have begun developing new
techniques for studying how adults reason about beliefs and other mental
states, based upon reaction time methods commonly used in cognitive
psychology. Much of this work suggests that theory of mind is demanding of
general cognitive resources such as memory and executive function. For
example, we find evidence that
belief inferences are not automatic, and
inferring beliefs may require effortful cognitive control. We also have
evidence that just
holding in mind what someone else thinks carries a
detectable cost when we know that what they think is factually incorrect.
Such findings are problematic for the idea that inferences about beliefs,
desires and intentions are made quickly and effortlessly as we engage in
social interaction and communication. Thus, in recent work with
Dana
Samson,
Jason Braithwaite and Ben Andrews I have begun to look at whether adults can
in fact make quick
and efficient inferences about what other people know and think in at least
some restricted circumstances (such as when they have direct visual access
to a scene). We suspect that these cognitively efficient abilities may use
rather different functional and neural processes from those that sustain the
cognitively demanding abilities we have studied so far.
A "two-systems" approach to theory of mind
In a recent paper with Stephen Butterfill I argue for a two-systems approach to everyday perspective-taking and social reasoning. We think it highly unlikely that a single psychological faculty for "theory of mind" could support both moment-by moment co-operation and competition, and the sort of complex psychological reasoning necessary for evaluating the guilt of the accused in a court of law. We suggest that these competing demands can only be satisfied by having distinct cognitive systems that make different trade-offs between flexibility and cognitive efficiency. Infants and some non-human animals have one or more cognitively efficient processes for "theory of mind", which also support adults' moment-by-moment social cognition. However, older children and adults have, in addition, a more flexible capacity for psychological reasoning that supports sophisticated judgements but makes heavy demands on memory and executive function. For us this sheds light on otherwise confusing patterns of success and failure in the theory of mind abilities of non-human animals, infants, children and adults. This line of thinking has motivated much of my recent empirical work.
Research on cognitive development (Homepage)
My developmental research concerns children's reasoning: reasoning about minds and external symbolic media such as words and pictures; reasoning about counterfactual and hypothetical situations; and the relationship between reasoning, executive function and symbolic cognition. (This work is conducted with Sarah Beck, Dan Carroll and Liz Robinson)
Development of theory of mind. In one strand of work we have investigated how children can take another person's perspective and reason about what other people think and know. It is well established that children's ability to think about other people's knowledge and beliefs undergoes important changes between 3 and 4 years. We have found clear evidence for substantial additional changes in children's understanding between 5 and 7 years (e.g., 1, 2). In recent work we have begun to adapt methods we have devised for studying theory of mind in adults in order to test older children who pass standard developmental tests of theory of mind. We are finding that patterns observed in the errors of young children (e.g., true belief tasks are easier than false belief tasks) often continue to be observed in the response times of older children, even though these older children usually respond correctly. A recent project conducted with Iroise Dumontheil and Sarah-Jane Blakemore also suggests that there may be changes in the ability to take account of a speaker's knowledge even in late adolescence.
The effect of symbols on executive function. The ability to adapt behaviour in a flexible manner is a mark of human cognition. In work with Dan Carroll I investigate the development of mental flexibility. In one project we investigate how symbols can change the way in which children think about tasks, and how this helps them gain control over their behaviour. The effects we observe in children show interesting similarities and differences to the effects that symbols have on mental flexibility in non-human animals such as chimpanzees.
Research on atypical development and genetic disorders (Homepage)
I collaborate with Chris Oliver and Sarah Beck on projects examining theory of mind and executive function in children and adults with a variety of genetic disorders. A paper on the relationship between theory of mind and executive function in children with Fragile X syndrome can be found here.
Current Ph.D students
- Nicola Cutting's Ph.D. concerns the role of observational learning in children's tool creation.
- Charlotte Easter's Ph.D. concerns the neural basis of theory of mind processes.
- Laurie Powis' Ph.D. concerns behavioural evidence of theory of mind abilities in children and adults with Cri du Chat syndrome and Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome.
- Andrew Surtees' Ph.D. concerns what develops in children's theory of mind abilities after they pass standard theory of mind tasks
- Jessica Wang's Ph.D. concerns automatic perspective-taking in typical adults
Former PhD students
- Claudia Chiavarino's Ph.D. concerned the role of reasoning about intentions in low- and high-level cognitive processes.
- Dan Carroll's Ph.D. concerned the relationship between reasoning and executive function
- Cathy Grant's Clin.Psy.D. concerned theory of mind and executive function in children with Fragile X Syndrome
- Adam Qureshi's Ph.D. concerned individual differences in basic theory of mind in typical adults.
Please contact me directly for more information about studying for a research degree in cognitive development or on adult mental state reasoning. i.a.apperly@bham.ac.uk